Suchergebnisse

"Introducing a re-conceptualized hedging framework, this book analyses the relations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the middle powers Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam with China in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The book provides a brief overview of the development of the relationships between the Southeast Asian states, ASEAN and China since 1989. The author argues that ASEAN and the majority of the Southeast Asian governments pursue a hedging strategy towards the rising China. They seek closer economic relations with Beijing, while maintaining strong security relations with Washington and also try to involve Japan. Hedging expands the strategic options of small and middle powers which are in Neorealism often restricted to bandwagoning and balancing. A hedging strategy, however, can simultaneously contain both elements of bandwagoning (e.g., in economics) and balancing (e.g., in security affairs). By examining the relations of ASEAN, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam with China and the US and Japan, the book puts forward a new, re-conceptualized hedging concept that combines foreign and security policy with economics. Adding significant new empirical knowledge, the book will be of interest to researchers in the fields of to the field of International Relations, Security, Political Geography, Economics, History and Asian Studies"--

"Introducing a re-conceptualized hedging framework, this book analyses the relations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the middle powers Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam with China in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The book provides a brief overview of the development of the relationships between the Southeast Asian states, ASEAN and China since 1989. The author argues that ASEAN and the majority of the Southeast Asian governments pursue a hedging strategy towards the rising China. They seek closer economic relations with Beijing, while maintaining strong security relations with Washington and also try to involve Japan. Hedging expands the strategic options of small and middle powers which are in Neorealism often restricted to bandwagoning and balancing. A hedging strategy, however, can simultaneously contain both elements of bandwagoning (e.g., in economics) and balancing (e.g., in security affairs). By examining the relations of ASEAN, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam with China and the US and Japan, the book puts forward a new, re-conceptualized hedging concept that combines foreign and security policy with economics. Adding significant new empirical knowledge, the book will be of interest to researchers in the fields of to the field of International Relations, Security, Political Geography, Economics, History and Asian Studies"--

To mitigate the risks and maximise the opportunities arising from China's great power behaviour, Malaysia employed a hedging strategy during Mahathir Mohamad's second term as prime minister. From 2018 until 2020, the middle power Malaysia applied direct engagement and elements of limited balancing and limited bandwagoning in a flexible yet consistent manner. Neither China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) nor its actions in the South China Sea caused a sea change in Malaysia's hedging strategy. Crucially, the policies towards China were embedded in omnidirectional, friendly, and well-balanced relations with the United States, Japan, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Theoretically, this contribution applies an updated concept of hedging, initially introduced by Cheng-Chwee Kuik. As an important innovation, it adds a specific component to assess the perceptions of the political leader(s) of risks and opportunities related to the hedging target as well as the strategic value of potential balancing partners. (JCCA/GIGA)

"Ist es denkbar, dass autoritäre Regime Menschenrechte glaubwürdig fördern? Solange das Dilemma zwischen staatlicher und menschlicher Sicherheit besteht, können Menschenrechte gegenüber nationaler Sicherheit ausgespielt werden." (Autorenreferat)

This article applies a modified version of the theoretical approach of the Copenhagen School to demonstrate that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has since 2001 reacted in a twofold way to the complex political obstacles to closer counter-terrorism co-operation: First, it has responded with securitising terrorism as a transnational crime and, second, with a depoliticisation and 'ASEANisation' of its counter-terrorism policies. Depoliticisation and 'ASEANisation', i.e. the framing of a security threat under the ASEAN Way values, are both deliberate political actions. They enable politicians to base co-operation among the ASEAN members and with outside powers on a non-political, technical basis. Contradicting an assumption of the Copenhagen School, this study argues that in South-East Asia where sovereignty and non-interference are still core principles this approach can offer better political opportunities to resolve a security threat than a 'classic' securitisation. Furthermore, this article demonstrates that ASEAN's anti-terrorism policies reflect its fragmented version of human security, which is based on national and regime rather than individual security. As counter-terrorism does not enjoy political priority in the region, these policies can only be a weak trigger for the implementation of ASEAN's notion of human security.

Dieser Artikel wendet eine leicht modifizierte Version der Copenhagen School an, um aufzuzeigen, wie die Vereinigung südostasiatischer Nationen (ASEAN) seit 2001 auf die vielfältigen politischen Hindernisse für eine engere regionale Anti-Terrorismus-Zusammenarbeit reagiert hat. ASEAN hat, erstens, eine Sekuritisierung des Terrorismus als transnationales Verbrechen und, zweitens, eine Depolitisierung und "ASEANisierung" (die Kontextualisierung einer sicherheitspolitischen Bedrohung unter den Werten des ASEAN Way) ihrer Anti-Terrorismus-Politik vorgenommen. Sowohl Depolitisierung und "ASEANisierung" sind bewusste politische Handlungen, die es den PolitikerInnen ermöglichen, die interne wie externe Zusammenarbeit auf eine unpolitische, technische Basis zu gründen. Im Widerspruch zu einer These der Copenhagen School wird hier argumentiert, dass ein solcher Ansatz in Südostasien, wo Souveränität und Nicht-Einmischung immer noch zentrale Prinzipien sind, realpolitisch bessere Chancen eröffnen kann, um ein sicherheitspolitisches Problem zu bewältigen als eine "klassische" Sekuritisierung. Zusätzlich zeigt der Artikel, dass ASEANs Anti-Terrorismus-Ansatz das fragmentierte Verständnis der Organisation in Bezug auf menschliche Sicherheit widerspiegelt. Dieses basiert stärker auf nationaler und Regime- als auch auf individueller Sicherheit. Da Anti-Terrorismus-Politik in der Region jedoch keine Priorität genießt, ist diese Politik bloß eine schwache Triebfeder für die Implementierung von ASEANs Verständnis von menschlicher Sicherheit. ; This article applies a modified version of the theoretical approach of the Copenhagen School to demonstrate that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has since 2001 reacted in a twofold way to the complex political obstacles to closer counter-terrorism co-operation: First, it has responded with securitising terrorism as a transnational crime and, second, with a depoliticisation and 'ASEANisation' of its counter-terrorism policies. Depoliticisation and 'ASEANisation', i.e. the framing of a security threat under the ASEAN Way values, are both deliberate political actions. They enable politicians to base co-operation among the ASEAN members and with outside powers on a non-political, technical basis. Contradicting an assumption of the Copenhagen School, this study argues that in South-East Asia where sovereignty and non-interference are still core principles this approach can offer better political opportunities to resolve a security threat than a 'classic' securitisation. Furthermore, this article demonstrates that ASEAN's anti-terrorism policies reflect its fragmented version of human security, which is based on national and regime rather than individual security. As counter-terrorism does not enjoy political priority in the region, these policies can only be a weak trigger for the implementation of ASEAN's notion of human security.

Die Vereinigten Staaten, die nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges ihr politisches und sicherheitspolitisches Engagement in Südostasien zurückgeschraubt hatten, entdeckten die Subregion strategisch neu - als, nach dem Mittleren Osten, "zweite Front" im "Krieg gegen den Terror". Wie der vorliegende Beitrag zeigt, stellt der Terrorismus für die Mitglieder der "Association of Southeast Asian Nations" (ASEAN) jedoch weder ein neuartiges Phänomen dar, noch verkörpert er in der Einschätzung der südostasiatischen Regierungen eine gegenwärtig zentrale sicherheitspolitische Bedrohung. Abgesehen vom kleinen Stadtstaat Singapur stellt der Terrorismus in keinem ASEAN-Mitgliedsland eine existenzielle Gefahr dar, die den Nation-Building-Prozess und die sozioökonomische Entwicklung langfristig unterminieren könnte. Im Bereich der Terrorismus-Bekämpfung war die regionale Zusammenarbeit in Südostasien bislang nicht tiefreichend. Die Gründe dafür liegen, wie der Beitrag zeigt, primär in den unterschiedlichen Bedrohungslagen innerhalb der ASEAN, der damit einhergehenden abweichenden Perzeption terroristischer Gefahren sowie in sehr ungleichen innenpolitischen Prioritäten und stark unterschiedlichen Kapazitäten von Militär, Polizei und Justizbehörden. Es wird argumentiert, dass die südostasiatischen Regime den Terrorismus "sekuritisiert" haben, und zwar im spezifisch südostasiatischen Kontext der Prinzipien Souveränität, Nicht-Einmischung und Output-Legitimation. Man kann daher von einer "ASEANisierung" des Kampfes gegen den Terrorismus sprechen. (ICI2)

This article argues that regional security cooperation in South-East Asia, mainly promoted by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), is a response to China´s economic rise. Although China is not regarded as a military challenge, Beijing's ascension threatens to undermine the regional balance of power. The emerging insecurities threaten the stability of the regimes whose power is based on output legitimacy. Cooperation, the thesis states, can reduce these uncertainties. Yet, whereas collaboration in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) offers Beijing incentives for the strengthening of its "enlightened" multilateralism, regional cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) will not change China's behaviour. The reason is that this cooperation is based on Realpolitik motives. Offensive Realism seems therefore well suited to analyse the Central Asian power relations. Even though the dimension of cooperation has not been included in John Mearsheimer's approach, this article demonstrates that it can conceptually be integrated into offensive Realism without contradicting its core theses. For this, however, its adherents must accept two assumptions: First, that the domestic political logic – in case of Beijing the output legitimacy of the Communist Party – must be integrated. Second, that there exists no automatism in international politics. Otherwise one would have to speak of the tragic of offensive Realism: Policies, based on this perception, does not offer China suffi cient incentives to further pursue multilateralism.